STEPHEN C. AVERILL; JOSEPH W. ESHERICK AND ELIZABETH J. PERRY Hardback $99.00 This extensively researched and elegantly written study offers a fine-grained analysis of the origins of the Chinese Communist Revolution in the countryside. Building on decades of research in newly available sources and multiple trips to Jiangxi, Stephen Averill provides a definitive local perspective on the rise of a revolution that reshaped China and the world. A rich work of social history, it goes beyond recently popular organizational approaches to explore the ways in which the party and social networks interpenetrated and interacted in the early stages of revolutionary base-building. The Jinggangshan highlands provided the base for Mao Zedong's first efforts at rural revolution. Chinese histories and most Western accounts have focused on the heroic exploits of Mao and his Communist Party comrades, battling the natural elements, hostile military forces, and skeptical authorities in the urban-based Communist Central Committee. This long-awaited work penetrates the hagiographic haze of Mao-centered analysis to provide a close narrative and rich social history of the Jinggangshan base. The author explores the historical patterns of local strongman rule, clientelist politics, lineage conflict, and ethnic struggle within which the party competed for power. Through this multifaceted lens, the revolutionary experience in Jinggangshan is equally dramatic but considerably more sobering than the conventional story. Among Western studies of the Chinese revolution, this work stands out as the definitive account of the critical moment in the 1920s when the physical and ideological center of the Communist movement shifted from the cities to the countryside. This was a process of elite-mediated political osmosis and adaptive compromises with local traditions. The party was not simply an outside force manipulating social tensions for its own political ends. There was, instead, an intricate interweaving of local networks and social cleavages in the highlands with the political structures and policy divisions of t « less

The Jinggang Mountains (Chinese: 井冈山; pinyin: Jǐnggāngshān; also Jinggang Shan or Jinggangshan) are a mountain range of the Luoxiao Mountains System (罗霄山), in the remote border region of Jiangxi and Hunan Provinces, in Central and East China. The range lies at the junction of four counties - Ninggang, Yongxing, Suichuan and Lingxian. The mountains cover some 670 km2 (260 sq mi), with an average elevation of 381.5 metres (1,252 ft) above sea level. The highest point is 2,120 m (6,960 ft) above sea level. The range's massif consists of a number of thickly forested parallel ridges. On the heights there is not much farmland and most settlements at the base of the mountains. The main settlement is at Ciping, which is surrounded by five villages whose literal meanings are Big Well, Little Well, Middle Well, Lower Well, and Upper Well. Henceforth came the name of the mountain range—"井冈山" literally means "Well Ridge Mountains". Contents [hide] 1 Base of the Red Army 2 Tourism 3 References 4 See also Base of the Red Army[edit] The Jinggang Mountains is known as the birthplace of the Chinese Red Army, predecessor of the People's Liberation Army) and the "cradle of the Chinese revolution". After the Kuomintang (KMT) turned against the Communist Party during the April 12 Incident, the Communists either went underground or fled to the countryside. Following the unsuccessful Autumn Harvest Uprising in Changsha, Mao Zedong led his 1,000 remaining men here, setting up his first peasant soviet. Mao reorganised his forces at the mountain village of Sanwan, consolidating them into a single regiment - the "1st Regiment, 1st Division, of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army". Mao then made an alliance with the local bandit chieftains Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai, who had previously had little association with the Communists. For the first year he set up military headquarters at Maoping, a small market town encircled by low hills guarding the main western route into the mountains. In November, the army occupied Chaling, some 80 km (50 mi) to the west, though this was quickly overrun by KMT troops. When pressure from KMT troops became too great, Mao abandoned Maoping and withdrew up the mountain to Wang Zuo's stronghold at Dajing (Big Well), from which they could control the mountain passes. That winter the Communists drilled with the local bandits and the next year incorporated them into their regular army. In February a battalion from the KMT's Jiangxi Army occupied Xincheng, a town north of Maoping. During the night of February 17, Mao surrounded them with three battalions of his own and routed them the next day. Zhu De and his 1000 remaining troops, who had participated in the abortive Nanchang Uprising, joined Mao Zedong toward the end of April 1928. Together the two joined forces and proclaimed the formation of the Fourth Army. Other veterans who joined the new base included Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi. The partnership between Mao Zedong and Zhu De marked the heyday of the Jinggang Mountains base area, which rapidly expanded to include, at its peak in the summer of 1928, parts of seven counties with a population of more than 500,000. Together with Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo's forces, their soldiers numbered more than 8000. A popular story from that period recounts the hardworking Zhu De carrying grain for the troops up the mountain since agriculture was nigh impossible in the mountain range itself. It was also around this period that Mao Zedong formulated his theories of rural-based revolution and guerrilla warfare. In July 1928, Zhu De's 28th and 29th regiments crossed into Hunan with plans to take the important communication hub of Hengyang. Mao Zedong's 31st and 32nd regiments were supposed to hold Maoping and Ninggang until Zhu returned. They were, however, unable to hold back the advance of the Kuomintang's Jiangxi units and lost Ninggang and two neighbouring counties. On August 30, the young officer He Tingying managed to hold the narrow pass of Huangyangjie with a single under-strength battalion against three regiments of the Hunanese Eight Army and one regiment of Jiangxi troops, thus saving Maoping from being overrun. As the size of the Communist forces grew and pressure grew from the Kuomintang, the Fourth Army was forced to move out. From January 14, 1929, the organisation moved to Ruijin, further south in Jiangxi province, where the Jiangxi Soviet was eventually set up. At the same time, the Kuomintang were executing another encirclement campaign, involving 25,000 men from fourteen regiments. Peng Dehuai was left in command of an 800-man-strong force, formerly the Fifth Army. By February, his remaining troops broke up under heavy attack from Wu Shang's Hunan troops. After the Jiangxi Soviet had established itself in southern Jiangxi, the Jinggang Mountains became the northwestern frontier of Communist operations. Peng Dehuai returned with a much stronger Fifth Army in early 1930, basing himself just north of the mountains. In late February 1930, the bandits Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo were assassinated by Communist guerillas, probably on orders from officials in the Jiangxi Soviet. Their men made Wang Yunlong, Wang Zuo's younger brother, their new leader. Most Communist forces left the area in 1934, when the Long March began. By the time they returned in 1949, Wang Yunlong had been succeeded by his son. He was charged with banditry and executed. Tourism[edit] Along with Mao Zedong's hometown, Shaoshan, the Jinggang Mountains is one of the most important sites of the Communist Revolution. It was celebrated on posters, songs and operas. During the Cultural Revolution, it became a place of pilgrimage for young Red Guards, who took advantage of a nationwide "networking movement". They often made the journey on foot to relive the experiences of their revolutionary forebearers. At its peak, more than 30,000 Red Guards arrived a day, causing terrible problems of food, housing, sanitation. Peak numbers continued for more than two months until the government began to discourage the young people. In 1981, an area of 16.6 km2 (6.4 sq mi) was designated a Natural Protection Area. The next year the mountains was listed as a National Priority Scenic Area. In recent years the Jinggang Mountains has become an attraction for domestic tourists interested in revolutionary history. The scenic area was classified as a AAAAA scenic area by the China National Tourism Administration.[1] According to Xinhua, tens of thousands of domestic tourists visit the mountain every year.[2] Sites promoted by the local authorities include the mint of the Red Army, the Revolution Museum, and the Martyrs Cemetery. In May 2004 a domestic airport was opened to attract tourists. References[edit] Jump up ^ "AAAAA Scenic Areas". China National Tourism Administration. 16 November 2008. Retrieved 9 April 2011. Jump up ^ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-04/02/content_815398.htm Missing or empty |title= (help)

Stephen C. Averill. Revolution in the Highlands: China's Jinggangshan Base Area. Foreword by Joseph W. Esherick and Elizabeth J. Perry. (State and Society in East Asia Series.) Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2006. Pp. xxxi, 451. $69.00. Odoric Y. K. Wou Am Hist Rev (2007) 112 (5): 1518-1519. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.5.1518 Published: 01 December 2007 PDF Cite Share Tools search filter search input Issue Section: Asia It took Stephen C. Averill decades to complete this book before his untimely death. But this long-awaited monograph is immensely gratifying. It represents one of the best scholarly works localizing the Chinese Communist Revolution. The study focuses on the revolution in the Jinggangshan highlands, a central base area where Mao Zedong and his associates acquired their early revolutionary experiences. Full of rich details and nuances, the book draws on new information from internal party documents and personal accounts by participants in the revolution. Revising the hagiographic image of Mao depicted in the standard party literature, Averill presents us with a very different perspective: that the Communist revolution was a complex process of policy contests, conflict resolutions, and negotiated compromises. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Jinggangshan was highly accommodative and adaptive, constantly reorienting its revolutionary policies according to shifting political and military circumstances. It is a joy to follow Averill's sophisticated analysis of the CCP debates in various phases of the revolution. Averill is particularly perceptive in his analysis of three major issues in the revolution. First is the close relation between social ecology and the regional revolution. Located in the rugged and inhospitable terrains, Jinggangshan consisted of a very polarized, militarized, and violence-prone society, which posed all sorts of challenges for Mao and the Red Army. Social cleavages such as lineage disputes, socioeconomic inequalities, ethnic tensions between Hakka-speaking guest people and early settlers, and factional rivalries among bandit groups and sworn-brother fraternities greatly complicated revolutionary mobilization in the region. Ethnicity, for instance, facilitated as well as constrained the revolutionary movement. There existed “some social and behavioral overlap between early settler and guest people communities” (p. 397). Communist land policies did not favor the guest people, Averill informs us. Second is the crucial role played by local strongmen in the hill country revolution. Lacking military resources in the start-up phase of the revolution, Mao built up the CCP's military strength by mobilizing and co-opting bandit groups in the mountains. In the study, Averill gives us detailed information on the personalities of two local strongmen, their “lamb-hanging” predatory operations, and the party's long trajectory of assimilating and weeding out these two bandit leaders. In Jinggangshan, bandit forces played a more pivotal role in the revolution, and Mao had better luck integrating such groups into the Red Army than other revolutionary leaders did in other regions, for instance, Henan province. But, similar to other areas, the CCP in Jinggangshan was also forced to abandon these bandit leaders because of their predatory behaviors and local attachment. Tension between the party and bandit strongmen became more intense in times of adversity in the 1930s. Third is the problem of intraparty conflict, especially between indigenous and extralocal revolutionaries. Averill traces the multilayered conflicts among the three forms of authority—local revolutionaries, regional leaders, and high-level party officials—in the highland revolution. Each had its revolutionary visions, vested interests, and revolutionary demands. Party cadres argued over vital political and military affairs such as the consolidation, integration, and coordination of the revolution, the function, construction, and expansion of the base area, combat strategies and tactics, and the role of the Red Army as revolution-building instrument. The party's long-range strategic considerations invariably came into conflict with local needs and requirements. Instead of looking at these disputes as CCP factional politics, Averill interprets the intraparty disagreements as evidence of conflicting priorities and differing options of military strategies. Mao, as leader of the regional party, frequently found himself struggling against the competing demands of the high-party and low-level cadres. The party skillfully reoriented and redefined its strategies throughout the revolution. Despite being locally contextualized, the book remains essentially a study of elite party politics and managing the revolution. In many places, Averill mentions efforts to proselytize the peasants and promote peasant associations. This study, however, does not go deeply into these major issues, not even in the chapter on socioeconomic reform, which still revolves around party policies and conflicts. Given the centrality of Jinggangshan in the history of the Chinese Revolution, one would expect a wealth of sources and in-depth information on mass mobilization and consciousness-raising activities in this particular base area. I wish Averill had had more time to explore these issues. But this rich and insightful study has already set a new standard for analyzing the Chinese Communist Revolution. It is a “must read” for anyone interested in local history, military history, ethnicity, revolutionary decision-making processes, and Chinese Communist studies. © 2007 American Historical Association. All rights reserved.