Anti-Secession Law
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Tsai sees through Xi’s game plan for Taiwan
BY FRANK CHING HONG KONG – Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, refused to bow to Beijing’s pressure when she delivered her first National Day speech Monday, but she called on China to value the positive results of cross-strait exchanges over the past 20 years and called for talks as soon as possible. Evidently responding to mainland China’s expressed desire for step-by-step progress toward a “final resolution” of political differences, Tsai called on Beijing “to face up to the reality that the Republic of China exists.” Leaders on both sides, she said, “should jointly display wisdom and flexibility and together bring a divided present toward a win-win future.” Most of the speech was devoted to domestic issues, such as housing, the predicament of young people, providing a life of dignity for the elderly, transforming the economy and judicial reform. But it was what she had to say about relations with mainland China that the rest of the world was interested in. And there she was crystal clear: She was not about to change the position she took when she was sworn into office, which was to maintain the status quo. “Not a single sentence from my inaugural address on May 20 has ever changed,” she said Monday. China issued a statement after her inaugural address saying that she “did not clearly acknowledge the 1992 Consensus or its core connotation” — namely, “one China” — and so it was “an incomplete test.” What China wants is for her to acknowledge that Taiwan and the mainland both belong to “one China.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides agreed that there was one China but disagreed on its interpretation. Beijing has suspended official and semi-official talks with Taipei. It has also moved to squeeze Taiwan’s international space. Last month, Taiwan was barred from a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a U.N. agency. Three years ago, when the more pro-China Ma Ying-jeou was president, Taiwan was allowed to take part for the first time in more than 40 years. Tsai, whose political party seeks the independence of Taiwan, has promised to maintain the status quo, but she has refrained from using the term 1992 Consensus required by Beijing. But, it seems, Taiwan and mainland China evidently have different definitions of the status quo. To Tsai, maintaining the status quo means not declaring independence but continuing the policies that existed during the Ma presidency. To Beijing, however, the status quo means a process of ever improving cross-strait relations which will over time lead to the political union of Taiwan and the mainland. If relations stop improving, in Beijing’s mind, the status quo has changed. What Beijing opposes is the indefinite prolongation of the cross-straits relationship in its present form, where Taiwan is independent. Ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party, the takeover of Taiwan has been one of its highest priorities. Mao Zedong called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, came up with the concept of “one country, two systems” for peaceful unification with Taiwan, and decided to try it out first in Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin, the next leader, was eager to set a deadline for resolution of the issue, but failed. Under Hu Jintao, China passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which gave Beijing the right to use force against Taiwan if “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” Even though Ma was considered China-friendly, he balked at the holding of political talks, preferring to discuss economic issues. But now, it seems, Beijing feels that it is time to tackle political issues, specifically, the issue of Taiwan’s unification with the mainland. Under Xi Jinping, China has grown more powerful than it has ever been. He is not shy about flexing, or even using, China’s muscles. In 2013, Xi indicated that his patience was wearing thin by telling a representative of President Ma: “The issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step, and these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” That is why Beijing is putting pressure on Tsai to accept the “one China” principle. In Beijing’s mind, once Taiwan agrees that it is part of China, then it is only logical for there to be talks on unification. And if Taiwan doesn’t agree to peaceful unification, Beijing will “employ non-peaceful means” as provided for by the Anti-Secession Law. Tsai clearly suspects that this is Xi’s game plan. She is wise not to play along.
Why the US Should Send Biden to Taiwan The inauguration of Taiwan’s next president offers a chance for the U.S. to send a signal to China.
By Joseph A. Bosco April 30, 2016 Next month’s inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen as president of Taiwan offers a unique opportunity for Washington to address two fraught issues in U.S.-China relations. First, sending an appropriate high-level American official to Taipei would signal U.S. commitment to the democratic security of Taiwan in the face of Beijing’s intensifying pressure. Second, it would elevate Taiwan’s status as a regional security ally, while using a diplomatic/political tool to respond to China’s increasingly aggressive moves. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. The sweeping victory of Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party rankles Beijing for good reason. The Taiwanese people soundly rejected deeper political ties with China, let alone any prospect of unification. Tsai was circumspect in discussing the cross-strait political and security situation during the campaign and in her victory speech. But her noncommittal stance on “one China” is unacceptable to Beijing. China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law threatens the use of force against Taiwan not only if it declares formal independence but also if “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted” – a contingency Beijing may have decided has now arrived. Henry Kissinger warned Taiwan in 2007 that “China will not wait forever.” And Xi Jinping said in 2013, “the [Taiwan] issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” Yet, even the Kuomintang Party under President Ma Ying-jeou said unification could be considered only with a democratic China. But Beijing never seems to grasp that the more it threatens Taiwan, the more it alienates younger generations of Taiwanese. They see how China treats the people of Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems” model Deng Xiaoping offered both societies. The Obama administration should make clear that the Taiwanese people are entitled to determine their relationship with China, without force or coercion from Beijing. After all, five generations of Chinese leaders have failed to meet Western expectations regarding China’s domestic political evolution. Though former premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly promised progress toward democratization, Xi has defiantly moved in the opposite direction, even reviving Mao Zedong’s teachings. Nor have Western policies of diplomatic engagement, international integration, and generous trade and investment moderated Beijing’s posture of grievance and hostility toward the West. Forty-five years ago, President Richard Nixon and Kissinger may well have given a tacit green light to China’s hostile designs on Taiwan. Kissinger recounts telling Mao he was surprised Beijing would be willing to wait 100 years to take the island. But Taiwan’s remarkable political development since then, and China’s dreary, and sometimes bloody, adherence to authoritarianism have invalidated any secret understanding reached over the heads of the Taiwanese people. Nixon himself wrote in Beyond Peace in 1994 that history had outdated unification and Taiwan’s democratic course made it an incompatible marriage partner for China. “The situation has changed dramatically … The separation is permanent politically, but they are in bed together economically.” Preparing for China’s coming leadership changes, U.S. President Barack Obama in 2011 dispatched Vice President Joe Biden to Beijing to meet with then Vice President Xi and cultivate a personal rapport that would then seamlessly become a president-to-president relationship with Xi’s ascension to China’s top positions. Yet, despite a series of touted Biden-Xi and Obama-Xi meetings since then, U.S.-China relations on key security issues have deteriorated significantly under Xi’s rule. The most dangerous area is the South China Sea, where Beijing has moved aggressively against its neighbors and challenged America’s role as protector of freedom of navigation and overflight. Recently, China further aggravated the situation by test-firing a multiple-warhead missile into the South China Sea, raising the specter of a first-strike capability, despite its disavowals of such an intention. The Obama administration needs to let the Chinese know that the United States will not stand idly by if China escalates its pressure on Taiwan. It is time to end the “strategic ambiguity” regarding America’s commitment to defend Taiwan. Nor should Washington abide Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea, where the former’s tepid and half-hearted response has not deterred further Chinese expansionism. The administration should affirm America’s position on both issues by demonstrating that the longstanding policy of excessive U.S. restraint in the face of Chinese provocation is coming to an end. That can be done first by responding in a non-military, yet dramatic, manner that will demonstrate to Xi that his strong-arm tactics will have unforeseen consequences. Tsai’s inauguration on May 20 provides the right occasion and choosing the right U.S. representative is important. The president should once again dispatch his vice president on a signaling mission addressed to China’s leaders. Sending Biden to Taipei will send a useful message to Beijing. Joseph A. Bosco is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as China country desk officer in the office of the secretary of Defense from 2005-2006.
How Hong Kong has lost its importance in cross-strait relations Tammy Tam looks at the blocking of Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to Hong Kong in the context of the city’s diminishing role as a cross-strait bridge
What can Hong Kong do today when it comes to cross-strait relations? Apparently, as a special administration region under the People’s Republic of China, the city is a sensitive political matter and even “dangerous” in the eyes of the current Tsai Ing-wen administration in Taiwan. That was why Tsai blocked her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou’s planned visit to Hong Kong as the guest of honour at last Wednesday’s prestigious news award ceremony organised by the Society of Publishers in Asia. It was Ma’s second failed attempt to visit his birthplace – the island’s former president from the anti-independence Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist party was born in Kwong Wah Hospital in Kowloon, thus automatically attaining the right of abode in Hong Kong, theoretically. But a quick review of his two unsuccessful attempts to visit the city speak volumes on the delicate status of post-1997 Hong Kong. While Ma was banned from leaving Taiwan by the office of the newly inaugurated president from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), he was also denied entry by Hong Kong back in 2005. He was then the mayor of Taipei, when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was president. Then-chief executive Tung Chee-hwa and Ma were personal friends, but that was no guarantee of anything in such a sensitive matter. Ma was supposed to come for a conference on Sino-US relations, but he revealed that two groups of people from Hong Kong had tried to persuade him not to submit his visa application – which he refused. The government’s standard answer was “no comment on individual cases” when being grilled by the media. However, up in Beijing at the time, the National People’s Congress was to pass the country’s first anti-secession law. Ma had complained that such a move would pose a military threat to Taiwan. Ma’s stand on the law was believed to have sunk his visa application, as Beijing would not allow Hong Kong to be used as a platform for any Taiwanese political figure to openly challenge its sovereignty claim. For Beijing, the handling of Taiwan affairs is a matter of the one-China principle; it’s that simple. The two cases were different in nature, but carry the same message and show how the role of Hong Kong has evolved. Historically, Hong Kong had been a “go-between” venue for cross-strait communication. “Messengers” from both sides used to meet up here for various unofficial exchanges. After the handover, not only does Hong Kong have to seek Beijing’s approval for any official contact with Taiwan, the ups or downs of cross-strait relations have also became a key consideration in related decision-making. This reminds me of the comment made by Lung Ying-tai, Taiwan’s culture minister under Ma’s presidency, who was once invited to be a visiting professor at the University of Hong Kong. “A rather big challenge for Hong Kong now is how to reposition its relations with Beijing,” Lung pointed out when visiting the city in late 2012. She suggested Hong Kong was no longer the go-between for cross-strait manoeuvrings, a unique and indispensible role it once played. Lung was right in this regard. Beijing today does not have to rely on Hong Kong for cross-strait contacts, direct links between Beijing and the now-opposition KMT and other parties having long been established. What has worried Beijing more instead in recent years is this: Hong Kong has not only failed to be a convincing showcase for Taiwan to accept “one country, two systems”, but certain local politicians, including young people, seem attracted to the island’s democratic development – some even going to the extent of direct exchanges with Taiwanese independence activists. It is therefore not at all surprising that today, neither Beijing nor Taipei sees Hong Kong playing a significant role in drawing both sides closer.
Knowledge Graph
Examples
1 The Anti-Secession Law is a law of the People's Republic of China (PRC), passed by the third conference of the 10th National People's Congress.
2 Although Anti-Secession Law, at ten articles, is relatively short, it was met with much controversy because it formalized the long-standing policy of the PRC to use "non-peaceful means" against the "Taiwan independence movement" in the event of a declaration of independence.
3 Anti-Secession Law is composed of ten articles.