Military and National Defence >Thoughts and Theories
Deng Xiaoping 's Military Theory
Deng Xiaoping 's Military Theory requires the absolute leadership of the Party over the army, and proposes a target of military building by following modern international trends. At the same time, it proposes the transformation of national defense construction strategy through new demands on the direction of army building.
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Transformation and Refinement of Chinese Military Doctrine: Reflection and Critique on the PLA’s View

By Dr. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang The concepts of “people’s war” (or military doctrine) and “active defense”(military strategy) are two fundamental components of Mao Zedong’s military thought. “Military doctrine” (junshi zhidao sixiang/zhunze) provides both the political vision on the nature of warfare and military guidance for the armed forces to follow. Because military doctrine must adapt to reflect changes in the strategic and political environment, it is not surprising that the doctrine of people’s war (renmin zhanzheng) has undergone substantial revision in the last 20 years and that these changes have mirrored changes in China’s security environment and national priorities. However, despite these changes in the doctrine of people’s war, a decade-long debate still rages within the PLA over whether this doctrine, changes and all, is, in fact, obsolete. On the one hand, some officers argue that advances in military technology and the RMA have rendered Mao’s concepts untenable.However, official publications and statements by the PLA and related institutions maintain that the concept of people’s war remains a key feature of modern warfare. Accordingly, this chapter addresses two fundamental questions: (1) Is the doctrine of people’s war truly obsolete, despite Deng Xiaoping’s modifications to adapt it to “modern conditions”? and (2) How does Deng’s concept of “people’s war under modern conditions” differ from Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on high technology? To highlight both the changes and continuities in Chinese military doctrine and to evaluate various official interpretations, this chapter relies on a close textual reading and critical examination of the PLA’s own views on the evolution of people’s war as expressed in official publications and personal interviews. Through this effort, the author hopes to contribute to a more complete understanding of the PLA’s doctrinal transformation in the past 20 years which might serve as a guide to future doctrinal developments. The Concept of People’s War: A Status Report In Chinese military publications, the term “people’s war” embodied several different concepts, including military thought (junshi sixiang), military strategic thought (junshi zhanlue sixiang), military theory (junshi lilun), military school of thought (junshi xueshuo), military doctrine (junshi zhidao sixiang/junshi zhunze), and operational forms (zhuozhan xingshi). Similarly, in the West the term “people’s war” had multiple meanings, depending on the context in which it was used. From a political perspective, it described the revolutionary nature of the PLA and the unique relationship between the CCP and the military. When used in the context of military doctrine, “people’s war” referred to a continental defense based on cooperation between regular and irregular military forces (i.e., between the “army” and the “people”). Operationally, people’s war referred to a type of warfare based on mobility, attrition, and other guerrilla-type tactics. Irrespective of which definition of people’s war is used, the real question remains: Is “modernized” people’s war (xiandaihua renmin zhanzheng) still a traditional Maoist type of people’s war? According to the original definition of people’s war as “war conducted by a suppressed class or nation (minzhu) through mass mobilization in order to liberate itself,” the term is outdated and no longer relevant to China’s current security challenges. However, alternative definitions of people’s war put forth by various PLA analysts and researchers offer a more fruitful avenue for discussion and analysis. The following section presents a collection of views based on the author’s interviews with PLA officers in Beijing and Washington, D.C. These views can be classified into the three categories described below. People’s War Is Obsolete Proponents of this view point to a statement allegedly made by Deng Xiaoping that the era of war based on “millet and rifles” (xiaomi jia buqiang) has passed, meaning that the old forms of people’s war such as sparrow warfare (maquezhan), tunnel warfare (didaozhan), and other forms of guerrilla warfare are no longer effective because of advances in military technology. Therefore, the doctrine of people’s war has no relevance to present military and security challenges. Furthermore, the concept of people’s war is predicated on a war fought within China, which explains Mao’s emphasis on the “three combination” (sanjiehe) of 133 regular army units, local army forces, and the people’s militia. However, changes in the international environment make conflict on or beyond China’s borders increasingly plausible and advances in military technology render reliance on the masses for logistics and other combat support untenable. Finally, the cost of conducting people’s war as envisioned by Mao would be prohibitive, as China would not be able to sustain the resource requirements for maintaining a militarized society for any length of time. Also, deploying relatively untrained and underequipped militia against a technologically advanced adversary would likely be suicidal and could rapidly lead to a political crisis. People’s War Is Forever Other PLA officers hold a diametrically opposed position—namely that the doctrine of people’s war encapsulates timeless principles of warfare that are the product of accumulated PLA warfighting experience. According to adherents of this position, the essence of people’s war can be expressed in a famous Chinese idiom, an unending process of “crossing the river by feeling the stones beneath the water.” Because this doctrine is based on China’s domestic situation, changing security environment and stage of military development, it remains a source of guidance for Chinese army building. In addition, the doctrine of people’s war embodies ideals of justice, the use of military for only defensive purposes, and unity between the army and the people. Thus, as stated by a retired senior PLA officer, a renunciation of people’s war could imply that China will abandon its long-standing defensive military posture, which would cause alarm among China’s neighbors. While proponents of people’s war recognize that modern warfare relies more on a standing professional army than on the mobilization of the masses, they stress that the role of ordinary people is still important, particularly with respect to computer warfare and passive BMD. Also, they point to the fundamental and indispensable role of public support of the state in any national crisis. Therefore, officers, researchers, and analysts in this camp conclude that while the form of warfare must change in accordance with advances in technology, the core principles of people’s war that address the relationship between man and weapons and between the army and the people remain not only valid but essential for guiding the development of the PLA. People’s War Cannot Be Abandoned Yet A third group occupies the middle ground in this debate by adopting a more pragmatic view that while the doctrine of people’s war possesses little utility and relevance in the conduct of modern warfare, the PLA currently lacks the equipment and ability to plausibly engage in such conflicts. Therefore, immediately abandoning the doctrine of people’s war while the PLA can only think or talk about high-tech warfare does not represent a prudent option. Precisely because the debate on the salience of people’s war remains unsettled, the current state of PLA doctrine is difficult for outsiders to ascertain, especially as a wider range of opinions is tolerated in official publications. However, it is safe to say that actual changes in doctrine are probably much smaller in degree than suggested by a review of the literature. First, views stated in official publications still represent divergent perspectives that have not matured and gained mainstream acceptance. For example, a number of articles in PLA publications are simply copied from foreign military publications and serve more to inform various PLA constituencies about foreign developments than to serve as authoritative guidance. Also, the transition to a new doctrine must most likely be preceded by the acquisition of appropriate hardware and other resources. While the PLA lacks such equipment in sufficient quantities, there will be little incentive for changing the status quo. Therefore, while it may be obvious to those inside and outside the PLA that the doctrine of people’s war is not well suited to warfare under modern conditions, changes in doctrine will only come about slowly.

China: From Mao to Deng

Ahmed Shawki looks at the rise of Mao and the development of China up to the death of Deng Ziaoping. He shows that "socialism with Chinese characteristics" had–and has–very little to do with the socialism of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky. The Honorary Chairman of the Chinese Bridge Association died February 19 of "complications of lung infections" associated with Parkinson’s disease. At 92 years of age, this was the only formal post Deng Xiaoping held at the time of his death. But before taking up bridge, he was chairman of the Central Military Commission until he resigned in 1989, the year of the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests. Despite his official departure from politics, Deng continued to be China’s "Paramount Leader," wielding enormous influence and power. Deng Xiaoping belonged to a tiny core of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who had survived the bloody crushing of the 1925-1927 revolution, the Long March and years of guerrilla struggle, Japanese invasion, and the subsequent upheavals and purges that followed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Indeed, Deng not only survived where others disappeared but managed several comebacks. Before his "rehabilitation" and return to power in 1973 and then again in 1977-1978, he had been denounced as one of the "two main capitalist roaders" and purged in 1967 and then again in 1976. Deng was one of the main targets of denunciation during the Cultural Revolution. The "Great Helmsman"–Mao Zedong–didn’t mince words. "Deng is a rare talent," said Mao. "He is like a needle wrapped in cotton. He has ideas. He does not confront problems head-on…His mind is round, but his actions are square." Henry Kissinger, who as Secretary of State under the Nixon administration helped engineer "normalization" of U.S.-China relations, dismissed Deng as "a nasty little man." This "nasty little man" oversaw the violent repression of demonstrators at Tiananmen square, and said of them: "We should never forget how cruel our enemies are. We should have not one bit of forgiveness for them." The official appraisal of Deng was more flattering. The New China News Agency offered this assessment: The death of Comrade Deng Xiaoping is an immeasurable loss to our Party, our army and the people of various ethnic groups throughout the country and will certainly cause tremendous grief among the Chinese people. We must conscientiously study Deng Xiaoping’s theory of building of socialism with Chinese characteristics, learn from Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s revolutionary style and his scientific attitude and creative spirit in applying a Marxist stand, viewpoints and method to studying new problems and solving new problems. Without Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s theory, there would not be the new situation of reform and opening up in China, and there would not be the bright future of China’s socialist modernization. It is not only in China that Deng was viewed reverently. Uniformly, the leaders of the major western capitalist powers and their media were quick to eulogize him. "Such a rare combination of skills and political genius does not come often in a national leader," the Wall Street Journal solemnly declared February 20. Bill Clinton said Deng would be remembered as an "extraordinary figure on the world stage over the past two decades." Ironically, "Communist China" is now one of the showcases for pro-capitalist ideologues. China has become the favorite example of the benefits of the market and of untrammeled capitalism. The "market reforms"–or in Deng doublespeak "Socialism with Chinese characteristics"–have indeed had a massive impact on China. With a growth rate averaging 9 percent per year since 1978, China now boasts, according to the 1996 World Almanac, the second biggest economy in the world. The U.S. investment bank Salomon Brothers notes that China is "probably the most attractive long-term environment for equities in Asia." "Deng Xiaoping Theory" was summed up by his slogan: "We should let some people get rich first, both in the countryside and in the urban areas. To get rich by hard work is glorious." Deng himself knew that this was really a Reaganite trickle down theory saying: "When I die they will not call me a good marxist." The critical question, however, is not how good a Marxist Deng was, but whether he was a Marxist at all. Most commentators on China, whether they approve or disapprove the changes that have taken place in the last two decades, share a common framework: that China has been moving away from some form of socialism towards capitalism (as the western pundits argue), or from some form of socialism to another form of market-oriented socialism. The problem with such views, however, is that they can make no sense of the Chinese revolution, of Maoism or of the present day. Take just one example of what such thinking produces on the left. Writing in a journal whose title he hasn’t quite digested, Victor Lippit informs readers of Rethinking Marxism in the Spring 1993 issue: China can be thought of as a society potentially in transition to socialism. The movement away from central planning is a movement away from statism and bureaucracy, not a movement away from socialism. The dramatic gains in living standards, growing rural-urban equality, and the rapid decrease in poverty suggest that substantial gains in the reform era are accruing to the working population, both rural and urban. It is also true that some capitalist entrepreneurs have become quite prosperous, as have some bureaucrats through various forms of corruption. Nevertheless, it appears that the lion’s share of the rising surplus has been garnered by people who work for a living. This suggests that the reform era is at least consistent with an ongoing transition to socialism. Such views not only fail to explain the fundamental dynamic of Chinese society but also make a mockery of any concept of genuine socialism. The essence of socialism is no longer workers’ control over society, but which bureaucrats are in power and what state policies they pursue. Many on the U.S. left in the 1960s and 1970s dismissed or failed to even consider the position of the working class in a so-called workers’ state. The fact that a tiny handful of men ruled China with an iron fist was ignored, and their empty rhetoric about "Proletarian Revolution" was taken as gospel. When the rulers of China curtailed the rhetoric and embraced U.S. imperialism, their cheerleaders on the U.S. left found themselves disillusioned and disoriented. Worse, many became vocal opponents of "socialism" because they’d seen it and it didn’t work. But to judge what is going on in China by what its rulers say is as misguided as judging what goes on in the U.S. on the basis of White House press releases. It’s a useless–not to mention boring–exercise. Of course, Deng Xiaoping maintained that his reforms were intended to improve the socialist system in China–even if some of the measures were antithetical to any notion of socialism. By the mid-1980s China had become a "socialist planned commodity economy." By the 14th National Congress in 1992, China underwent another metamorphosis and become a "socialist market economy." "A market economy is not capitalism," explained Deng, "because there are markets under socialism too." Apparently, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" appears to have all the features of capitalism. Notwithstanding commentators east and west, there is not a huge gulf between Mao and Deng. Mao and Deng represented different approaches, different strategies to the same end: the economic development of China under the direction of a state capitalist ruling class. No matter what their differences–and there were many–they never disagreed on the need to defend the bureaucracy against the mass of workers and peasants. What existed under Mao and what exists today have nothing to do with socialism and workers’ power. Socialism–as this article will aim to show–is not in China’s past, but in its future. "Marxism," as Simon Leys wrote, "has acquired a very bad name in China–which is quite understandable, though somewhat unfair: after all, it was never really tried." Deng and Mao The mainstream media has downplayed Deng’s role in the Tiananmen Square massacre and highlighted his skill at transforming China into a market economy. Most commentators treat Deng’s policies as representing a sharp break from the politics of other CCP leaders, especially Mao. The problem with this view is that it forgets that Deng–who became a member of the party in 1924–shared an outlook that united him with Mao and other party leaders more than it divided them. Depending on what period is selected, Mao and Deng can be shown to have the identical view on China’s future. The official ideology which has them representing the "proletarian" and "capitalist" interests respectively reflects not class struggle but the clashes within the same class of bureaucrats. The different fractures and struggles in China’s top leadership represented the falling out–and often different strategies–for achieving the same ends. By the early 1970s, Deng’s "reforms" were known as Mao and Zhou’s reforms. The most frequently mentioned saying of Deng, "It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice," is interpreted as meaning that it didn’t matter whether or not China was socialist or capitalist. But this is only accepting the meaning given this phrase when Mao wanted to get rid of Deng. The real discussion was much more limited. Deng’s full statement reads as follows: For the time being, the most important thing is to increase food production. In so far as individual enterprises can further this production they are a good thing. It is not important whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice...The best form of production is that which, within the framework of local conditions, is most likely to restore and develop production. Deng and several other leaders of the CCP became irritated at Mao’s habit of acting independently of the bureaucracy. It became more than an irritation after Mao launched the Great Leap Forward that set back the economy by a decade. Deng’s approach was to try and curb Mao and concentrate power among the party leadership. Mao couterattacked and ousted Deng for a time. But after the chaos created by the Cultural Revolution, Mao brought Deng–a tried and tested organization man–back to restore the authority and prestige of the Party. The Tiananman Square massacre was not an aberration. Deng always repressed dissent that threatened him and tolerated that which served his purposes. He organized the inner-party "rectification" campaign in 1937; ran the "anti-rightist" campaign in 1957; shut down the Democracy Wall protest in 1978; launched the "anti-spiritual" campaign of 1983; directed another purge in 1983-86 and expelled leading dissident intellectuals in 1987. Like Mao, Deng died with blood on his hands.

Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics’ Into the 21st Century

Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997 JIANG ZEMIN III. Historical Status and Guiding Significance Of Deng Xiaoping Theory During the new period of" the socialist reform, opening up and modernization drive and the cross-century new journey ahead, we must hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory and apply it to our entire cause and all our undertakings. This is an unshakable conclusion the Party has drawn from the history and realities. The Chinese Communist Part attaches great importance to the guiding role of theory. Since the Chinese people found Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese revolution has taken on an entirely new look. The integration of Marxism-Leninism with China's reality has experienced two historic leaps, resulting in two great theories. The result of the first leap was the theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China and a summary of experience therein, both of which have been proved correct by practice. Its principal founder being Map Zedong, our Party has called it Map Zedong Thought. The result of the second leap was the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Its principal founder being Deng Xiaoping, our Party has called it Deng Xiaoping Theory. These two great theories so achieved are the crystallization of the practical experience and collective wisdom of the Party and the people. Ever since it was founded, our Party has taken Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology. After the Zunyi Meeting and the Yanan Rectification, the Party decided at its Seventh Congress to take Map Zedong Thought-the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution-as its guiding ideology. This historic decision was based on a summary of the experiences of 24 years after the founding of the Party. On the basis of the Third Plenary Session of the llth Party Central Committee and 12th, 13th and especially 14th congresses of the Party, the Party Central Committee has proposed that the 15th Party Congress establish Deng Xiaoping Theory as its guiding ideology by stipulating in its Constitution that the Chinese Communist Party takes Marxism-Leninism, Map Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as its guides for action. This historic decision has been made by our Party after nearly 20 years of successful practice of the reform, opening up and the socialist modernization drive. It shows the determination and conviction of the central collective leadership and the whole Party to bring about an all-round advancement of the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics initiated by Deng Xiaoping toward the new century. It also reflects the common understanding and aspirations of the people of the whole country. Practice proves that Deng Xiaoping Theory, a continuation and development of Map Zedong Thought, is a correct theory guiding the Chinese people in successfully accomplishing their socialist modernization in the process of reform and opening to the outside world. In China today, it is Deng Xiaoping Theory, which integrates Marxism with the practice of present-day China and the features of the times, and this theory alone, that can settle the issues concerning the future and destiny of socialism. Deng Xiaoping Theory is Marxism of present-day China, representing a new stage of developmerit of Marxism in China. The reasons why Deng Xiaoping Theory has become a new stage of development of Marxism in China are as follows: First, Deng Xiaoping Theory, upholding the principles of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts, not only inherits the achievements of predecessors but also breaks with outmoded conventions on the basis of new practice, and explores a new realm for Marxism. Seeking truth from facts is the quintessence of Marxism, of Map Zedong Thought, and of Deng Xiaoping Theory as well. The speech titled Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future made by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 was a declaration which, at the end of the "cultural revolution" when China was at a crucial historical juncture and was faced with the question of which course to take, shattered the argument of the "two whatevers" (the notion that after the death of Chairman Map Zedong, whatever policy decisions he had made must be firmly upheld and whatever instructions he had given must be followed unswervingly-Tr.), opened up a new road for a new era and initiated the new theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. The talks given by Deng Xiaoping in the south in 1992 constituted another declaration showing the spirit of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts, which, at a crucial historical juncture when we experienced severe tests of political disturbances at home and abroad, upheld the theory and line formulated since the Third Plenary Session of the llth Party Central Committee, cleared up many important misconceptions that had long shackled people's thinking, and promoted the reform, opening up and the modernization drive to a new stage. Under the new situation when the 21st century is approaching and when we are faced with many hard issues we have never met before, Deng Xiaoping Theory requires us to emancipate our minds and seek truth from facts more firmly and more conscientiously, and judge everything by the fundamental criterion whether it is favorable toward promoting the growth of the productive forces in a socialist society, increasing the overall strength of the socialist state and raising people's living standards, or the "three law)rable" for short, so as to open new horizons for our cause. Second, Deng Xiaoping Theory, upholding the basic achievements of the theory and practice of scientific socialism, has grappled with the fundamental question of "what socialism is and how to build it" and has incisively expounded the essence of socialism, raising our understanding of socialism to a new scientific level. To emancipate the mind in the new period, the key lies in doing it on this question. Failure to have a very clear understanding of this question has, in the final analysis, been the cause of the twists and turns and mistakes our socialism experienced before the reform and opening up, and the cause of the perplexities people encountered on their way forward since then. The efforts to set things right and the all-round reform from taking class struggle as the key link to taking economic development as the central task. from closedness or semi-closedness to reform and opening up, and from a planned economy to a socialist market economy- these historic changes of the past 20 years have constituted a process of gradually understanding this fundamental question. And this process will continue in practice in the years to come. Third, Deng Xiaoping Theory persisting in observing the world in the broad perspective of Marxism, has made new, scientific judgments on the basis of correctly analyzing the features of the times and the overall international situation, the success or failure of other socialist countries in the world, the gains or losses of developing countries in seeking development, and the trend of development and conflicts of developed countries. Great and rapid changes are taking place in the world, and particularly, the daily advancing science and technology have profoundly changed and will continue to change the current economic and social activities and the appearance of the world. Marxists of any country have to take this seriously. It is in these circumstances that Deng Xiaoping Theory has determined the line and international strategy of our Party, requiring us to understand, carry forward and develop Marxism from a new point of view, and stressing only that is true Marxism and that sticking to conventions can only lead to backwardness and even failure. This shows Deng Xiaoping Theory is clearly geared to the times. Fourth, to sum up, Deng Xiaoping Theory constitutes a new, scientific system of the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. It has been gradually formed and developed under the historical conditions in which peace and development have become the main themes of the times, in the practice of China's reform, opening up and modernization drive, and on the basis of reviewing the historical experience of successes and setbacks of socialism in China and learning from the historical experience of the rise and fall of other socialist countries. For the first time, it has given preliminary but systematic answers to a series of basic questions concerning the road to socialism in China, the stages of development, the fundamental tasks, the motive force, the external conditions, the political guarantee, the strategic steps, Party leadership, the forces to be relied on, and the reunification of the motherland. It has guided our Party in formulating the basic line |or the primary stage of socialism. It is a fairly complete scientific system which embraces philosophy, political economics and scientific socialism and covers, among other things, the economy, politics, science and technology, education, culture, military and foreign affairs, the united front and Party building. It is also a scientific system which needs to be further enriched and developed in all aspects. Deng Xiaoping was a great Marxist. He performed immortal deeds for the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation, for the establishment of the socialist system in China and |or its reform, opening up and modernization drive. He dedicated all his life to the Chinese people, with the interests of the people as the starting point and objective in everything he did. His greatest contribution to the Party, the people and Marxism, or his valuable legacy to us, is Deng Xiaoping Theory. This theory is embodied in the works of Deng Xiaoping and the important documents of the Party and the state written since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee. Marxism is a science which is firmly based on objective |'acts. Actual life, however, is always changing and the changes over the past century and more have been so drastic and profound that our predecessors could hardly have conceived them. Hence, Marxism will necessarily advance along with the development of the times, practice and science; it cannot remain unchanged. There is a question concerning the style of study of Marxism whether we should indulge in book worship or use the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method to study and solve the practical problems in China. During the rectification campaign in Yanan, Mao Zedong emphasized, "A policy should be established of focusing on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded." Today when we advocate arming the whole Party with Deng Xiaoping Theory and studying Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought with the focus on studying the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, we mean precisely to carry |brward this fine tradition. We must never discard Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. If we did, we would lose our foundation. Meanwhile, centering on the practical problems in the reform, opening up and the modernization drive and on the things we are doing, we must emphasize the application of the Marxist theory, the theoretical study of practical problems, and new practice and development. It is meaningless to talk about Marxism in isolation from a given country's reality and the development of the times. We would get nowhere if we studied Marxism statically and in isolation, and separated it from its vigorous development in actual life, or set them against each other. In present-day China, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory constitute a unified scientific system imbued with the same spirit. Adhering to Deng Xiaoping Theory means genuinely adhering to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; upholding the banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory means genuinely upholding the banner of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

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Examples

1 Deing Xiaoping's military theory is the succession and development of Marxist military philosopical theory in the new era of the country.

2 This thesis analyses the theoretic roots of Deng Xiaoping’s military theory from three aspects:

3 Deng Xiaoping’s military theory has three inspirations .