History >Historical Events
Treaty of Aihui
The Treaty of Aihui, also known as the Peace Treaty of Aihui City, is an unequal treaty signed in Aihui on May 28, 1858 between Russia and the Qing Dynasty. This treaty deprived China of the territories including the north of Heilongjiang and south of Stanovoi Mountains covering an area of about 600,000 square kilometers. According to this treaty, China’s territories on the east of the Ussuri River would be jointly governed by China and Russia; only the Chinese and Russian ships would be allowed to navigate in the Ussuri River. The treaty was recognized by the Government of the Qing Dynasty upon the entry of the Treaty of Beijing between China and Russia in 1860.
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Quiet frontiers

By Pauline D. Loh (China Daily) Manzhouli's famous Wedding Chapel is built on a hill, allowing visitors a vantage point from which to view the town. Cang Lide / China Daily It's a peaceful northern post that has seen more than its share of China's revolutionary history. Today, it struggles to keep its unique position as a historic border town while facing increasing pressure to become economically viable. Pauline D. Loh visits Manzhouli in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region. China has many border crossings on land and sea, but none has the romance and history of this little city tucked away in the northeast of the country on the vast Hulunbuir grasslands. On the map, it is settled like a tiny birthmark at the base of the Chinese rooster's comb. It's located many kilometers from its nearest urban neighbors in Heilongjiang province and about two hours from Beijing by air. The Russian town of Zabaykalsk is situated immediately north of Manzhouli. Manzhouli is China's largest port of entry on land, and it carries the baggage of a lot of history, stamped by the influences of the past in both architecture and lifestyle. This is an old land at the edge of vast, primitive grasslands that are wet, wild and windy. Remains of prehistoric peoples have been found here, as was an almost whole mammoth skeleton. It's the traditional pasture grounds of nomadic tribes, ancestors of modern Mongolians and Manchurians, including famous invaders of the past, such as the Xiongnu and Khitan. The town itself and its name actually originate from a rather humbling part of Chinese history when, in the declining years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the Russians forced Beijing to sign the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and effectively created the present boundaries between China and Russia. Another treaty signed in 1896 created the China Far East Railway, which opened up train tracks between China and Russia and made Manzhouli the first point of entry into China from the Russian bloc. Manzhouli finally became part of the Inner Mongolia autonomous region in 1949 with the founding of the People's Republic of China. In the early days of revolution before New China, Chinese Communist leaders were smuggled across the border here to attend meetings with their Soviet counterparts. Even further along the timeline, the last Qing emperor, Puyi, was captured at its railway station, in a failed attempt to escape across the border. These days, however, the only people stopped at Manzhouli are travelers without the proper papers. This is China's largest border checkpoint. It boasts a monumental guomen, or national gate, which serves double duty as a center to process border formalities and as a favorite tour site for domestic travelers. Russia, within hailing distance and a double row of barbed wires across no man's land, is linked via the historic train tracks. Only Chinese citizens are allowed into the checkpoint grounds. Foreigners, with or without passports, are normally refused entry. Within the compound is a museum documenting Manzhouli's beginnings and rise to recognition. There's a shopping mall as well, selling everything from Russian chocolates to Siberian furs. When the Chinese economy opened up in the 1980s, Manzhouli awoke from its long slumber as a back post. It became an important center for Russian-Chinese trade. By the 1990s, it was a booming hub of cross-border transactions. Some of these businesses, however, fell by the wayside when Russian authorities banned trade on commodities they felt were draining their natural resources, such as the vast amount of timber that was going by the trainloads into China. There were once hundreds of timber yards thriving in Manzhouli. But fewer than five still stand and, at most, only one operates, because of the higher costs of importing Russian logs. This is only one of many links this Chinese border town shares with its nearest and largest neighbor. Many Russians still visit, crossing the border from smaller towns and cities, such as Chita, Krasnokamensk, Irkutsk and Ulan Ude - all connected by rail. The city's demographics reflect historic influences. While more than 90 percent of Manzhouli's inhabitants are Han Chinese, there are also Mongolians, Buryat Mongolians, Manchus and Russians. Some Russians migrated here several generations ago and have Chinese names, Chinese spouses and very little of their mother tongue. The only betrayal of their origins is probably their sharper facial features, "especially the nose", says our guide Xiao Zhao, whose husband is the descendant of a Russian trader. She tells us he no longer speaks Russian, although he has a grandmother who still cooks him Russian bread and borscht, the famous root vegetable soup served with sour cream. At the largest and probably only international class hotel in town, guests are welcomed with a bread and salt ceremony at the Shangri-La Manzhouli, in a colorful display of tradition. The hotel's young executive sous chef also manages a pretty authentic Russian menu, with shashliks (traditional kebabs), beef stroganoff and a pickled herring terrine taking pride of place. Manzhouli's night scene, too, mirrors the influences, with nightspots and restaurants catering to Russian tour groups. They come specifically for vodka and entertainment - especially live shows at such opulent restaurants as Maxim's, featuring Chinese and Ukrainian singers, acrobats and magicians. But the dwindling trade between China and Russia is already showing its aftermath, and the glitzy nightlife is now attracting more tourists from other Chinese cities, with bigger wallets and a greater willingness to spend. Signs in the city are often in four languages. Because this is the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Mongolian is an official language, with Chinese and English also visible everywhere. But at the heart of the action, along the Third and Fourth Avenues, the neon lights are still all in Russian. In terms of architectural influences, there are wooden cabins and stone cottages that look more at home in the steppes than on the grasslands, and grimly uniform Soviet-style buildings make their presence felt. Huge orthodox churches dot city corners but have been mostly converted into secular use. The city also holds a Guinness World Record for having the world's largest matryoshka, the Russian doll. It is a 30-meter-high construction inside of which shops sell the actual dolls, all carefully tucked inside each other in increasingly smaller sizes. The outside of the huge taowa, as the Chinese call it, is painted with the images of three dolls, each respectively dressed in Chinese, Russian and Mongolian attire to represent the cultural demographics. Manzhouli's Taowa Square is a popular tourist site. The square itself features brass statues of the 12 Chinese zodiac animals as well as sculptures from various fairytales and other icons of moral examples. To attract a better tourist profile, the town had also built a dusty red cathedral-like building on a hill that allows visitors a vantage from which to view the town. This is Manzhouli's famous Wedding Chapel, which intends to attract couples to hold their marriage ceremonies here. Besides the glitzy, exotic dollhouse buildings in Manzhouli and its rambunctious nightlife in Russian restaurants, coal mining is a thriving industry. Petroleum and other valuable natural resources have been discovered in the last 20 years. Tourism is slowly shifting focus toward the area's natural environments. In the right season, it's a bird-lovers' paradise, offering sightings of hundreds of thousands of cranes, wild geese, bustards and other migrating species on the vast wetlands along the rivers. Anglers, too, are attracted by opportunities to fish in the region's hundreds of lakes and rivers. At the riverside resort of Hohnur, modern yurts equipped with TV sets welcome visitors, and there are thoughtful hygiene facilities set up all along the roads and at scenic locations for those important bathroom breaks. Even so, Manzhouli is still relatively undiscovered. One reason is possibly because of the long cold period and short "growing season", says Leslie Wang, general manager of the Shangri-La Manzhouli. "There are limitless opportunities to develop tourism here. The summer and autumn periods are truly beautiful, with the wetlands and the grasslands at their best." Yet the laidback lifestyle that's the attraction here can also be the biggest hurdle. There's no apparent hurry to develop tourist resources, and few flights arrive at Manzhouli airport apart from the two regular daily flights from Beijing. Even the flight from Inner Mongolia's capital Hohhot is a transit route from Zhejiang province's capital Hangzhou in southeastern China. While the mining industry may be developing, it is not enough to support a thriving population on its own. Property prices are low in comparison to major Chinese cities, and 4,000 yuan ($650) per square meter condominiums are everywhere. But there are few buyers. Most who do buy use the properties as holiday homes. The answer to sustainable urban development still seems to point to tourism - but with a more educated approach that will sell the attractions without destroying the innocence and originality that so characterize Manzhouli. Contact the writer at paulined@chinadaily.com.cn Cang Lide contributed to this story.

TREATY OF AIGUN, 1858

The great Empire of Russia, the Governor-General of Western Siberia acting for it, and also Lieutenant-General Nicholas Muraviev, aide-de-camp to his majesty Emperor Alexander Nicolayevitch; And the Great Ta-Tsing Empire, with Prince I Chan, aide-de-camp, noble of the Court, and Commander-in-Chief of the Amur, acting for it; Wish to establish an internal and intimate friendship between their two empires. In the interests of their subjects they have signed this accord: Article I The left bank of the Amur River, from the Argun River to the mouth of the Amur, will belong to the Empire of Russia, and its right bank, downstream as far as the Ussuri, will belong to the Ta-Tsing Empire. The territories and places situated between the Ussuri River and the sea will continue, as before, to be held in common by the Ta-Tsing Empire and the Russian Empire, with a settling of the frontier to come eventually. Only ships of the Ta-Tsing and Russian empires may navigate the Amur River, the Sungari, and the Ussuri. All others are excluded. The Manchu inhabitants of the left bank of the Amur, from the Zeya River to the village of Hormoldzin to the south, will always keep the place of dwelling which they have had during the time of Manchu government, and Russian inhabitants may not vex or offend them. Article II In the interests of good understanding among the subjects in question, the shore-dwellers of the Ussuri, the Amur, and the Sungari, are allowed to trade together, and the authorities must reciprocally protect traders on both shores. Article III The stipulations arrived at by the Plenipotentiary of the Empire of Russia, Governor-General Muraviev; and the Commander-in-Chief of the Amur, I Chan, who was the Ta-Tsing’s representative, will be well and fully carried out, for ever. To this purpose, Governor-General Muraviev, for Russia, put a copy of this Treaty in the hands of Prince I Chan. It was written in Russian and Manchu. Prince I Chan, for his part, placed a copy (this one written in another pair of languages: Manchu and Mongol) in the hand of Governor-General Muraviev. All the stipulations herein contained will be published for the surrounding populations, the inhabitants of the edges of the two Empires. May 16, 1858, City of Aigun NICHOLAS MURAVIEV PIERRE PEROFFSKY I CHAN DZIRAMINGA

Fighting between Soviet and Chinese Frontier Guards on Far Eastern Border. - Protest Demonstrations in China and Soviet Union. - Soviet Proposal for Boundary Negotiations.

Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 15, April, 1969 China, Soviet Union, Soviet, Chinese, China, Soviet Union, Page 23313 ? 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Fighting between Soviet and Chinese Frontier Guards on Far Eastern Border. - Protest Demonstrations in China and Soviet Union. - Soviet Proposal for Boundary Negotiations. Armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards, causing considerable loss of life, occurred on March 2 and March 15 on the River Ussuri, which forms the border between the Chinese province of Heilungkiang and the Soviet Far East. The scene of the fighting was a small uninhabited island 1 1/2 miles long by half a mile wide, known to the Russians as Damansky Island and to the Chinese as Chenpao Island, which lies about 110 miles south of Khabarovsk and 250 miles north of Vladivostok. The frontier in this area is regulated by the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Treaty of Peking (1860), which were imposed on China by the Tsarist Government at a time when that country had been weakened by a war with Britain and France in 1856-58. The Treaty of Aigun gave Russia sovereignty over 230,000 square miles north of the River Amur and placed 150,000 square miles east of the Ussuri (the Amur's principal tributary) under joint Sino-Russian control, whilst the Treaty of Peking incorporated the territory east of the Ussuri into the Russian Empire. Although the territory involved consisted of sparsely-populated wastelands and had never been settled by the Chinese, having become part of the Chinese Empire only as the result of the Manchu conquest in the 17th century, its annexation by Russia in such circumstances remained a long-standing grievance, and Chinese spokesmen suggested in 1963 and 1964 that China reserved the right to demand its return. [see 19566, 20368] The status of Damansky Island under these treaties is disputed. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of March 10 contended that under international law the central line of the main channel of the Ussuri formed the boundary line, that the island was situated on the Chinese side of this line, and that it had always been under Chinese jurisdiction and had been admitted to be Chinese by the Soviet delegation at boundary negotiations in 1964. A Soviet Note of March 29 [see below], on the other hand, maintained that a map approved by both Governments in 1861 showed the Chinese bank of the Ussuri as the boundary line in this area. The problem was complicated by the fact that after the breaking up of the ice in spring the Ussuri regularly floods its banks and frequently shifts its channel. Following the deterioration in relations between the two countries numerous minor incidents had occurred on this and other sections of the Sine-Soviet border from 1960 onwards. Boundary negotiations began in Peking on Feb. 25, 1964, but were suspended in the following August without any progress having been achieved. The Soviet Note of March 29, 1969, stated that the Soviet delegation had put forward proposals at these talks for the “clarification” of certain sections of the border, but the Chinese had “tried to question the historically established State frontier”; according to the Chinese statement of March 10, the Chinese delegation, while regarding the Treaties of Aigun and Peking as “unequal treaties,” had offered to take them as a basis for determining the entire alignment of the boundary, subject to “necessary readjustments at individual places on the boundary by both sides,” but the Soviet side had refused to accept these proposals. Although it was agreed in principle to resume the talks in Moscow at a later date, no further negotiations have in fact taken place. During the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution in China a tense situation developed on the border, especially in February 1967 [see 22047-48]. According to diplomatic sources in Moscow, many minor incidents took place in 1968, but neither side gave them any publicity; a Chinese protest Note of Sept. 16, 1968, however, alleged that Soviet military aircraft had flown over Heilungkiang province 29 times between Aug. 9 and 29. The Chinese statement of March 10, 1969, asserted that Soviet frontier troops had intruded into “the Chenpao Island area of China” 16 times between Jan. 23, 1967, and March 2, 1969, wounding Chinese frontier guards on several occasions, whilst Major-General Vasily Lobanov (Soviet commander in the Pacific frontier district) claimed on March 16 that Chinese troops had repeatedly attempted to capture the island during the past 18 months. Diametrically opposite accounts of the clash on March 2 were given by the two sides. According to the Soviet version, about 300 Chinese soldiers, camouflaged in white cloaks, crossed the frozen river during the night of March 1–2 to Damansky Island, where they lay in ambush. In the morning about 30 more Chinese approached the island, and when Soviet frontier guards came up to them to protest opened fire without warning. At the same time both the troops on the island and others on the Chinese bank of the river opened fire with rifles and artillery on another group of Soviet frontier guards. With the help of reinforcements from a neighbouring post, it was stated, the Soviet troops had expelled the intruders after a two-hour battle in which they had lost 31 killed, including an officer, and 14 wounded. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, stated that a large Soviet force, accompanied by four armoured vehicles, had opened fire on Chinese frontier guards who were on normal patrol duty, killing and wounding many of them. Both Governments sent strongly-worded protest Notes to the other on March 2. The Soviet Note demanded an immediate investigation, the punishment of those responsible for the incident, and immediate steps to preclude any further violation of the frontier, and declared that “reckless and provocative actions by the Chinese authorities” would be “met on our side by a rebuff.” The Chinese Note similarly demanded the punishment of the culprits, reserved the right to demand compensation, and declared that if the Soviet Government continued to “provoke armed conflicts” it would receive “resolute counter-blows.” Mass protest demonstrations began on March 3 outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking, which for four days was virtually besieged by thousands of Chinese servicemen and civilians shouting such slogans as “Hang Kosygin” and “Fry Brezhnev.” Similar demonstrations, in which according to the New China News Agency 260,000,000 people took part, were held in the next few days throughout China. On the Russian side, although demonstrations took place in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok on March 3–4, there were no demonstrations in Moscow until March 7, when over 50,000 people marched past the Chinese Embassy in the largest organized protest seen in the city for many years; some of the crowd threw stones, lumps of ice, ink bottles, and paint bombs at the building, and many windows were broken. At a press conference on March 7 Mr. Leonid Zamyatin (head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry press department), after giving the first detailed account of the incident, alleged that the Chinese had shot and bayoneted wounded men, and that the faces of some of those killed had been “so mutilated as to be unrecognizable.” An even larger demonstration than that of the previous day occurred outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow on March 8, over 100,000 people taking part, although on this occasion there were no disorders; protest meetings were also held on March 8–9 in many other Russian cities. In Peking protest demonstrations against the stoning of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow began outside the Soviet Embassy on March 11, and continued for three days. Red Flag (the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical organ) declared on March 14 that if the Soviet leadership wanted to fight, “let us thoroughly annihilate them.” The article added: “The Soviet revisionists have created such theories as ?limited sovereignty? to help Soviet troops march into other countries. This makes us understand that their recent armed provocation is no mere coincidence.” A Chinese Note of March 13, which the Soviet Embassy refused to accept, alleged that between March 4 and March 12 Soviet armoured vehicles had “intruded into China's territory, Chenpao Island,” on six occasions, and that Soviet helicopters had twice flown over it during this period. Soviet official statements claimed that a group of Chinese soldiers had attempted to “invade” the island on March 14 but had been driven off. Further fighting occurred on March 15, and was apparently on a much larger scale than that on March 2. General Lobanov told the Press on March 16 that Chinese infantry in regimental strength–or up to 2,000 men–had launched repeated attacks on the island under cover of artillery and mortar fire from the Chinese bank, and had been driven back, with the aid of frontier guards from neighbouring posts and the reserve, only after seven hours? fighting. According to the version given by Peking Radio, large numbers of Soviet troops supported by tanks repeatedly attacked the Chinese frontier guards on duty on the island, and were driven back after an 11-hour battle during which Soviet heavy artillery and tanks shelled the island and the Chinese bank of the river. Although neither side gave details of the casualties, these were evidently heavy; Soviet press reports mentioned by name 12 officers and n.c.o.s who had been killed, including a colonel, suggesting–according to the Moscow correspondent of The Times–that a full regiment of frontier guards and reserves, or nearly 3,000 men, had been engaged on the Soviet side. Only minor incidents were subsequently reported from the area. The Soviet Press reported on several occasions between March 18 and April 8 that the Chinese had directed mortar and machine-gun fire against the island and were digging fortifications on their side of the river, whilst Peking Radio alleged on April 13 that the Russians had committed “new acts of aggression” on the Ussuri frontier, without giving any further details. A Chinese Note of March 15 accused the Soviet Government of “incessantly” sending troops to intrude into Chinese territory, and demanded that it should immediately stop its “armed provocations.” A Soviet Note of the same date maintained that “Damansky Island is an inalienable part of Soviet territory,” and declared that “if further attempts are made to violate the inviolability of Soviet territory, the U.S.S.R.and all its peoples will resolutely defend it and will deliver a crushing rebuff to such violations.” For some days after the fighting on March 15 both the Chinese and the Soviet Press published virulent and bellicose attacks on the other country's leaders; the Peking People's Daily described “Khrushchev, Kosygin, Brezhnev, and company” on March 20 as “a herd of swine,” asserting that the Soviet people hated “the new tsars,” whilst the Soviet armed forces newspaper Red Star denounced Mao Tse-tung on March 23 as “a traitor to the sacred cause of Communism… painted with human blood” and compared him to Hitler. The fact that protest demonstrations were not resumed in either country, however, despite the seriousness of the latest fighting, suggested that both Governments were anxious not to push matters to extremes. In a long and moderately-worded Note of March 29 the Soviet Government reaffirmed in detail its claim to sovereignty over Damansky Island, and proposed that the boundary negotiations broken off in 1964, should be resumed as soon as possible. After giving the Soviet version of the incidents on March 2 and 15, the Note recalled that after the Russian Revolution the Soviet Government had repudiated all unequal and secret treaties with China, and had renounced all Russian spheres of influence, extra-territorial rights, and consular jurisdiction in China. The repudiation of these treaties had been given legal status by an agreement with China signed in 1924, but this agreement had not referred to the Treaties of Aigun and Peking as unequal or secret, and there had been no question of annulling or revising them. The Chinese Communist Government, the Note contended, had signified its acceptance of the existing frontiers by concluding an agreement on shipping on the Amur and the Ussuri in 1951, and by asking the competent Soviet authorities for permission to use certain islands in those rivers for cutting hay and timber–an indication that they did not question the Soviet claim to those islands, including Damansky Island. The Note went on to recall the friendly relations between the two countries in the 1950s, and commented: “If it were not for the position adopted by the Chinese side, trade, economic, and scientific and technical co-operation between our countries would undoubtedly have developed successfully further. This also holds true for today…. Whenever a danger arose to the security of the People's Republic of China. the Soviet Union, loyal to its commitments under the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, always came out in support of People's China.” [These statements were interpreted by Western observers as a suggestion that in the event of a change in Chinese policy the Soviet Union would be prepared to resume its economic aid and diplomatic support to China.] After deploring the breaking off of boundary negotiations, and recalling that the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, had said in 1960 that the unestablished sections of the Soviet-Chinese frontier were “insignificant discrepancies in the maps, easy to solve peacefully,” the Soviet Note urged the Chinese Government to “refrain from any actions on the frontier that may cause complications and to solve any differences that may arise in a calm atmosphere and through negotiations.” It proposed that the consultations started in Peking in 1964 should be resumed as soon as possible, and concluded: “The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that in the final count the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples will make it possible to remove and overcome difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet Government has stated, and considers it necessary to repeat, that it resolutely rejects any encroachments by anyone on Soviet territory, and that any attempts to talk to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people in the language of weapons will be firmly repulsed.” A second Soviet Note of April 11 proposed that the boundary negotiations should be resumed in Moscow on April 15 or at any other early date convenient for the Chinese.–(Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - Peking Review - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Le Monde - New York Times) (Prev. rep. 22045 A.) ? 1931- 2011 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC

Knowledge Graph
Examples

1 In 1858 (Treaty of Aigun) Russia annexed the land north of the Amur.

2 Following the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 a new Amur Cossack stanitsa appeared on the site.

3 The resulting treaty established a border between the Russian and Chinese Empires along the Amur River.