Zhu De
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‘Dixie Mission’ Americans Scorned for Backing Mao Are Hailed in China
By JANE PERLEZ YAN’AN, China — In 1944, a group of American diplomats in a beat-up C-47 propeller plane swooped down onto a rocky runway in Yan’an. Their mission was to assess Mao Zedong, who had made the city in northern China his guerrilla redoubt, and judge whether he deserved American backing. Some of the Americans concluded that because Mao had the support of the people, he would have the upper hand in the inevitable civil war with Chiang Kai-shek, viewed by Washington as obstinate and corrupt. They were in favor of the United States throwing its weight behind Mao. For that judgment, they saw their careers destroyed during the McCarthy era. They became victims of the witch hunt for so-called Communist sympathizers and those who “lost” China. But to this day in Yan’an, they are heralded as the good Americans who understood China, and are even featured in a museum and compound here that eulogizes the Communist Party’s embattled origins and endurance. Continue reading the main story Advertisement Continue reading the main story One of the Americans, John Paton Davies Jr., jotted down his impressions of the city: “Yenan — which we called Dixie since it was rebel territory — was from the air a thoroughly insignificant Northwest China town set in a treeless valley. The eroded, lumpish plateau that rose from the valley floor on either side was, in late October, parched bare and tan.” Some of the others in the Dixie mission were also State Department China experts, like John Stewart Service. Some were United States Army officers, like the mission’s leader, Col. David D. Barrett, a Chinese-speaking former military attaché. In some respects, the old Communist Party stronghold has barely changed. The caves that the cadres used as hide-outs from Japanese bombers still exist, buried into the bleak hills like black eyes. The Yellow River remains a scrawny thread of water. The sense of isolation from the modern metropolises on the faraway coast persists. The food, stingy during wartime, remains surprisingly plain. Yan’an is now a city of two million people, much of the progress coming on the back of oil and gas, and patriotic tourism designed to attract Chinese citizens curious about the Communist Party’s history. Senior cadres, dressed in black suits and chauffeured around in small vans, come to refresh their knowledge of the party’s early years under Mao, who fought both the Japanese and the Nationalist forces. The museum, the Yan’an Revolution Memorial Hall, is a hulking edifice built 10 years ago that commemorates the Communist Party’s perseverance in the face of scarce food and diseases, like dysentery, that killed because of the lack of penicillin. The displays say nothing about the brutal ideological purges conducted by Mao and his secret police chief, Kang Sheng. In one startling image of Service, who was born in China to American missionaries, he is dressed in work clothes, bending over to help a Chinese worker level rocks on the airport runway. Another shows Davies, dressed in a dark shirt and pants, standing in an official tableau with Mao, Zhou Enlai and other party officials. The Americans called their living quarters the “dude ranch,” and Davies, also the son of American missionaries, describes in the memoir “China Hand” its eight rooms as dirt-floored, each with two beds fitted with straw mattresses. Heat came from charcoal braziers, and light from kerosene lamps. The “ranch” has been rebuilt (brick flooring added) with wooden pillars in front, and with windows that in a touch of authenticity have glass only halfway up the wooden frames. A few hundred yards away, a similar building marks the place where the border region military command was housed. A plaque notes that the command’s political commissar at the time was Xi Zhongxun, the father of the president of China, Xi Jinping. The Americans had regular meetings, talking tactics and post-World War II prospects, with Zhu De, the Communist commander in chief, who would later lead the forces to victory over Chiang’s Nationalists. “The Dixie Mission had closer relations with senior Chinese military officers than any Americans have had with the Chinese Communists command before or since,” Richard Bernstein wrote in “China 1945,” his book about the period. The Chinese were fascinated with the Americans’ luxuries: The soldiers each had several uniforms, they enjoyed canned food, and whenever they needed drugs, a plane would arrive with the supplies. The Americans showed Hollywood movies in their cafeteria. The Chinese soldiers would peer in, shocked by the images of men and women kissing. “Vulgar taste,” Li Yaoyu, a Chinese veteran, later wrote of the movies. “We would leave, allowing these confusing Americans to watch on their own.” Despite the outward bonhomie, an underlying thread of distrust gnawed at the relationship. When the civil war began in the fall of 1945, the Communists built a wall between the “dude ranch” and Xi’s building to protect secrets. The Communists coveted the far more sophisticated American weapons. Li wrote how he and his colleagues had connived to steal an American rifle so they could copy it. “We drove two American soldiers to a valley in an American jeep to find a Christmas tree,” he wrote. On the way back, the Chinese announced that the tree had to be delivered in the jeep immediately and that the Americans would have to walk back. Once the jeep returned to headquarters, the Chinese disassembled the rifle, and measured it, all in an effort to figure out how to make it. Things fell apart when Mao, who had never been out of China, asked for a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the White House. “Mao wrote a letter asking the Dixie mission to deliver it to F.D.R., saying Mao and Zhou Enlai were willing to go to Washington,” said Zhao Hong, an associate professor of history at Yan’an University. “The letter was given to Wedemeyer, the commander of American forces in China, but it was not delivered to the president. The contact failed, and the Communists lost faith,” she said. (Ms. Zhao was referring to Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.) The museum ignores the ruined careers of the Americans who portrayed Mao in a positive light. Davies was fired in 1954 during a brief personal audience with the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Service was dismissed in 1952, though a Supreme Court decision reinstated him in 1957. John Carter Vincent, a diplomat who first proposed the Dixie mission to the United States government, was forced to leave the State Department in 1952. Mr. Bernstein, in his book, called Davies and Service “smart and dedicated public servants” who were “naïvely dazzled” by the Communists. Ms. Zhao, who has devoted her academic career to the Dixie mission, is not particularly critical of the American decision to stand by Chiang. “The Americans were practical. They were looking after their own self-interest,” she said. “They wanted a pro-American government, and Chiang Kai-shek was easier to manipulate than the Communists.” As for the men who supported the Communists but suffered for it, she said: “Service really understood China. After a long talk with Mao, he wrote that China would not be a replica of the United States, or a replica of the Soviet Union.” He was right, she said.
Theories on Zhou Yongkang’s takedown, and a brief history of Chinese purges
When the Chinese Communist Party announced Zhou Yongkang’s detention yesterday, it surprised exactly no one. The CCP has been closing in on the former head of China’s police and legal system, since at least Oct. 2012, when Xi Jinping became president. As the jails have filled up with Zhou’s cronies and Zhou himself languished under house arrest, it became increasingly clear that his official detention was a “when,” not an “if.” Less clear—in fact, entirely opaque—is why exactly Zhou had to be brought down in the first place. Here are the prevailing narratives: Xi the all-powerful: Zhou’s detention violates the “unspoken rule” that former high-ranking officials receive amnesty from corruption charges, in a sign that Xi is brandishing his political might and willingness to crush political enemies. Zhou reportedly opposed Xi’s ascension. Zapping Jiang Zemin’s power base: After the ouster of Bo Xilai and Gen. Xu Caihou, Zhou’s takedown eliminated the last remaining source of influence for former president Jiang. The triumph of Xi’s “anti-corruption crusade”: To restore the country’s faith in the Communist party, Xi had to clean up its ranks by making an example of corrupt officials. Bagging Zhou—who along with this family and allies amassed $14 billion in ill-gotten wealth—proves that no one is above the law. Clearing the path for economic reform: To force the party elite to support his economic reform agenda, Xi needed to threaten the powerful bureaucrats behind state-owned companies—Zhou’s patronage network included the state-owned oil sector—and more generally conservative leaders. Ousting opposition to rule of law: A variation on the previous theory, this one argues that Zhou’s extensive connections from his years as head of security and the judiciary required Xi to remove him before instituting the rule of law (paywall), which China currently lacks. Factional infighting: The unprecedented takedown of such a high-up retired politician hints that the normal tussle between factions and interests has escalated to a degree the party’s stability may be in jeopardy. While some of those theories are plausible, none is wholly satisfying. They’re also just guesses: with the exception of Xi and a few dozen colleagues, no one ever really knows what’s going on inside the party. There is one thing about which we can be sure, though. By busting Zhou, Xi is engaging in a time-honored tradition of CCP political purges. As you’ll see in the timeline below, one of the first things a new regime does when it takes over is to purge leaders who might form an institutional opposition to new policies—usually be charging foes with corruption. In other circumstances, purges have been used to eliminate political rivals who have grown too popular or too powerful. Here’s a rundown of the Chinese Communist Party’s greatest hits: Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Peng Dehuai: China’s minister of defense, vice-premier and vice-chairman of the National Defense Council in 1954, Peng was purged in 1959 for his criticisms of Mao and the Great Leap Forward. He was replaced by Lin Biao, whom Mao eventually eliminated as well. Zhu De: Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1945 and marshal of the PLA, Zhu was purged from the Politburo Standing Committee in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution for his supposedly anti-Mao sentiments, only to be reinstated in 1971. Liu Shaoqi: Having served many roles in the Chinese Communist Party, Liu took over Mao’s job as president of the People’s Republic of China in 1959. Yet during the Cultural Revolution, Liu’s disagreements with Mao saw him labeled a traitor, placed under house arrest and purged from the party in the late 1967. Liu died shortly thereafter. Deng Xiaoping: Ousted from power in 1933, Deng returned to the political stage only to be purged again in 1966 for his reform ideas—including free markets for farmers—following the devastation caused by the Great Leap Forward. However, he was rehabilitated and returned to leadership in 1973. Lin Biao: A veteran of the Long March and Cultural Revolution, Lin worked closely with Mao, putting together the Little Red Book, a treasury of Mao wisdom that symbolized the Chairman’s personality cult. Yet in 1971 Lin mysteriously died in a plane crash after supposedly mounting a coup; though no one really knows what happened, many suspect the “accident” resulted from Mao’s discomfort with Lin’s rising popularity. Hua Guofeng (1976–1981) Gang of Four: The gang—made up of Jiangqing (Mao’s third wife) and three other high-level officials— were put on trial in 1980 for various crimes committed during the Cultural Revolution including treason, attempting to seize power, and building their own army. Chen Boda: Mao’s political secretary and a key player in building up the cult of Mao, Chen was instrumental in purging leaders like Deng and Liu. However, he was purged from the PSC in the early 1970s after falling from favor. In 1980, four years after Mao died, Chen was tried along with other leaders of the Cultural Revolution and eventually sentenced to 18 years in prison, though he was released soon after on parole. Deng Xiaoping (1981-1989) Hu Yaobang: Former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang was purged in 1987 for his reform-centric, anti-corruption beliefs. His death became the catalyst for the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Zhao Ziyang: Deng’s prime minister, Zhao was purged and placed under house arrest in 1989 after expressing sympathy for the Tiananmen Square protesters, not to mention his beliefs in reform and criticism of the government. Zhao’s purge paved the way for Jiang’s rise. Yang family clique: After two generals, Yang Shangkun and his brother, Yang Baibing, started purging PLA officials and building up their own network of influence, Deng ordered their purge in 1992-1993. Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) Chen Xitong: Mayor of Beijing during the Tiananmen Square Protests, Chen was purged from office in 1995 on corruption charges and sentenced to 16 years of prison in 1998, supposedly for threatening Jiang’s power. Hu Jintao (2002–12) Chen Liangyu: Hu purged Chen, then party secretary of Shanghai and a Jiang protégé, in a high-profile corruption case in Sep. 2006. Bo Xilai: The former Chongqing party secretary and son of one of the PRC’s founders, Bo was a rising star in the party and populist sensation when his wife was arrested for the 2011 murder of a British businessman. Bo was sacked for abuse of power and, found guilty of corruption charges, was sentenced to life in prison in 2013. Li Chuncheng: The former vice party chief of Sichuan province was first detained in Dec. 2012; only in Apr. 2014 was he officially removed from his post after allegations of accepting large bribes. Li was a known Bo supporter. Xi Jinping (2012-) Gu Junshan: Lieutenant general and deputy chief of the PLA’s logistics department, Gu was charged with “bribery, embezzlement, misuse of state funds, and abuse of power” in 2012. He is still undergoing investigation as of Apr. 2014. Gu’s patron was Xu Caihou, and therefore, Jiang. Li Dongsheng: Li was removed from the post of vice minister of public security in Feb. 2014 amidst rumors of an anti-graft campaign surrounding Zhou Yongkang who was in office when Li became vice minister in 2009. Su Rong: Previous vice-chairman of China’s parliamentary advisory body, and loyal to Jiang Zemin, Su was purged in June 2014. He was investigated for allegedly violating party law; his wife was also suspected of ties to corrupt land and construction deals. Xu Caihou: Expelled from the party in late June 2014, Xu, an ex-general and Jiang ally, was accused of “accepting bribes in order to grant military promotions.” Wang Yongchun: Vice president of China National Petroleum and head of Daqing, China’s largest oil field, Wang was placed under investigation in Aug. 2013 for suspected corruption and embezzlement. He was expelled from the party June 2014. Ling Zhengce: Ling, vice-chairman of Shanxi’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was taken into custody June 2014 on corruption charges. His brother Ling Jihua, who worked as Hu Jintao’s personal secretary and who is said to be the founder of the “Shanxi gang,” a group of politicians who can trace their careers to Shanxi province, may soon fall under investigation too. Other members of the Shanxi gang—and those from Shanxi—were arrested in recent months on corruption charges including Xie Kemin, former deputy head of the Shanxi’s anti-corruption bureau; Wang Jiankang, Lin Zhengce’s brother-in-law and deputy mayor of Yuncheng in Shanxi; and Yang Senlin, the executive deputy secretary of the provincial graft-fighting body. Wan Qingliang: Guangzhou’s Communist Party secretary was dismissed from his post after corruption allegations. Wu Changshun: Wu, the head of the police in Tianjin, was detained earlier this month on corruption charges.
China's Soccer Program Improvement Comes with Political and Economic Implications
China’s plans on becoming a “soccer powerhouse” become more evident as schools in the mainland offer more training programs and authorities vow to build more training centers to hone the youth’s talent in the sport. In a report from the South China Morning Post, China Football Association deputy chairman Wang Dengfeng revealed these plans on Tuesday after Beijing announced the country's working blueprint that would help them have 50 million soccer players by the year 2020. Posing as the head of sports education policy at the Ministry of Education, Wang said that the plan is aiming to make President Xi Jinping's big soccer dream for Chinese athletes a reality. President Xi's Fondness of Soccer "The Chinese sports industry is developing. The Chinese government, including the sports and education ministries, support football more and are paying attention to youth development," the New York Times quoted Chinese national team coach Gao Hongbo as saying in March. "If we continue like this, China will become very strong." Apparently, this was because of Xi's fondness of the sport which, according to another report from the SCMP, began when he was still a child. Xi's long-term ambition for "the beautiful game" began when he was in middle school due to the influence of the communist revolutionary and his late father, Xi Zhongxun. "Xi Jinping, who was born in 1953, played football while at school in the 1950s and '60s and played alongside many second-generation communist revolutionaries, including the grandson of Marshal Zhu De, who was vice chairman of China," the outlet explained, adding that Xi's love for soccer may have also been influenced by past Chinese leaders who were also fond of the game. Economic and Political Implications Though there is no question about Xi's love for the sport, there appears to be more to it than what meets the eye. According to Time, soccer is a means to an end, explaining that there are "broad economic and political implications" of what Beijing is doing for the sport. Apparently, China wishes to become a "world football superpower" by the year 2050 by having a minimum of 70,000 pitches in place and 20,000 soccer training centers by 2020 in a bid to boost its FIFA ranking. According to Time, the move was sparked by the sudden revelation of Xi's love for soccer, which also spurred a lot of unprecedented investments in the Chinese Super League. "For the Chinese government, soccer prowess has become paramount to the nation's resurgence on the world stage--and will hopefully distract China's teeming population from a looming economic downturn," the outlet explained, adding that the blueprint for soccer development is the country's way of assuring that the investments made to their soccer league is not for naught.
Knowledge Graph
Examples
1 Zhu De was a Chinese general, warlord, politician, revolutionary, and one of the pioneers of the Communist Party of China.
2 Born poor in 1886 in Sichuan, Zhu De was adopted by a wealthy uncle at age nine; this prosperity provided him a superior early education that led to his admission into a military academy.
3 Zhu De was a high-ranking official within the Communist Party of China. He served as Commander-in-Chief during the Second Sino-Japanese War.